Corporate governance has received an increasing amount of attention in recent years. Corporate scandals have brought corporate governance weaknesses to the attention of the general public, especially in the United States. Weaknesses in the corporate structure of some Asian countries have been partly blamed for some recessions that have occurred there. This paper begins with an overview of some basic corporate governance principles as identified by the OECD, World Bank and IMF, then proceeds to examine how these principles are being applied in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam.
INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance has become an important topic in transition economies in recent years. Directors, owners and corporate managers have started to realize that there are benefits that can accrue from having a good corporate governance structure. Good corporate governance helps to increase share price and makes it easier to obtain capital. International investors are hesitant to lend money or buy shares in a corporation that does not subscribe to good corporate governance principles. Transparency, independent directors and a separate audit committee are especially important. Some international investors will not seriously consider investing in a company that does not have these things.
Several organizations have popped up in recent years to help adopt and implement good corporate governance principles. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the U.S. Commerce and State Departments and numerous other organizations have been encouraging governments and firms in Eastern Europe to adopt and implement corporate codes of conduct and good corporate governance principles.
The Center for International Private Enterprise (2002) lists some of the main attributes of good corporate governance. These include:
• Reduction of risk
• Stimulation of performance
• Improved access to capital markets
• Enhancement of marketability of goods and services
• Improved leadership
• Demonstration of transparency and social accountability
This list is by no means exhaustive. However, it does summarize some of the most important benefits of good corporate governance. All countries, whether developed or developing face similar issues when it comes to corporate governance. However, transition economies face additional hurdles because their corporate boards lack the institutional memory and experience that boards in developed market economies have. They also have particular challenges that the more developed economies do not face to the same extent. Some of these extra challenges include:
• Establishing a rule-based (as opposed to a relationship-based) system of governance;
• Combating vested interests;
• Dismantling pyramid ownership structures that allow insiders to control and, at times, siphon off assets from publicly owned firms based on very little direct equity ownership and thus few consequences;
• Severing links such as cross shareholdings between banks and corporations;
• Establishing property rights systems that clearly and easily identify true owners even if the state is the owner; (When the state is an owner, it is important to indicate which state branch or department enjoys ownership and the accompanying rights and responsibilities.);
• De-politicizing decision-making and establishing firewalls between the government and management in corporatized companies where the state is a dominant or majority shareholder;
• Protecting and enforcing minority shareholders' rights;
• Preventing asset stripping after mass privatization;
• Finding active owners and skilled managers amid diffuse ownership structures; and
• Cultivating technical and professional know-how (CIPE 2002) . 
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Minority Shareholder Protection
The company should have a formal policy that defines voter rights and which corporate actions require shareholder approval. There should also be a mechanism that allows minority shareholders to voice their objections to majority decisions. Minority shareholders should have the legal right to vote on all important matters, including mergers and the sale of substantial assets.
Firms should be encouraged to allow proxy voting and proxy systems should be available to all shareholders, foreign and domestic. Multiple voting classes should be eliminated where they exist. The number of nonvoting and super voting shares should be reduced or eliminated and all new issues should have a "one share, one vote" policy.
Cumulative voting should be permitted. Shareholder approval of takeovers, mergers and buyouts should be required. Any anti-takeover measures such as poison pills, golden parachutes and issuances of bonds with special rights in the event of a takeover should have to be approved by shareholders. Spin-offs should also require a majority vote of all shareholders.
Dilution of ownership or voting rights should require a majority vote of all shareholders, at the very least. The IIF recommends a supermajority vote as a "Best Practice." In the event of a takeover or delisting, all shareholders should be offered the same terms.
Shareholder approval should be required before a company can sell additional shares to existing majority shareholders after some threshold. Any capital increases should first be offered to any existing shareholders. Significant share buybacks should require shareholder approval.
Shareholders should be notified a sufficient time in advance of shareholder meetings. The "Best Practice" is to send a notice of the meeting and agenda at least one month prior to the meeting. Reasonable efforts should be taken to prevent vote fraud and to allow for a recount in the event an election is contested. Minority shareholders should be able to call special meetings and petition the board with some minimum share threshold.
Foreign and domestic shareholders should be treated equally. A policy should be established to clearly define who retains the right to vote when shares are traded close to the meeting date. Quorum rules should not be set too low or too high. The IIF recommends around 30 percent, which should include some independent minority shareholders.
Structure and Responsibilities of the Board
The company should define independence, disclose the biographies of board members and make a statement on independence. The IIF recommends that as a Best Practice a board member cannot (a) have been an employee of the firm in the past 3 years, (b) have a current business relationship with the firm, (c) be employed as an executive of another firm in which any of the company executives serve on that firm's compensation committee, and (d) be an immediate family member of an executive officer of the firm or any of its affiliates.
At least one-third of the board should be non-executive, a majority of whom should be independent. The Best Practice calls for a majority of independent directors. The board should meet every quarter for large companies. The audit committee should meet every six months.
Minutes of meetings should become part of the public record. The Best Practice would be to apply this rule to all companies.
The quorum requirement should be specified by the firm and should consist of executive, nonexecutive and independent nonexecutive members. Best Practice calls for representation by both executive and independent directors.
Nominations to the board should be made by a committee that is chaired by an independent nonexecutive. There should be a mechanism in place that would allow minority shareholders to put forth the names of potential directors at annual general meetings and extraordinary general meetings.
For large firms, directors should need to be re-elected every three years. The Best Practice rule would apply the three-year requirement to firms of any size. For large companies, the compensation and nomination committees should be chaired by an independent nonexecutive director. The Best Practice would be to extend this requirement to firms of any size.
The board should formally evaluate directors before their election, in the case of large firms. The Best Practice is to extend this requirement to firms of any size.
The board should disclose immediately any information that affect the share price, including major asset sales or pledges. Procedures should be established for releasing information. Best Practice calls for releasing information on the company website at through the stock exchange.
Remuneration for all directors and senior executives should be disclosed in the annual report. All major stock option plans should be disclosed and subjected to shareholder approval. The company's articles of association or bylaws should clearly state the responsibilities of directors and managers. This document should be accessible to all shareholders. The chairman or CEO should publish a statement of corporate strategy in the annual report.
Any actual or potential conflict of interest involving a board member or senior executive should be disclosed. Board members should abstain from voting in cases where they have a conflict of interest. The audit or ethics committee is required to review conflict of interest situations.
The integrity of the internal control and risk management system should be a function of the audit committee, according to the Best Practice guideline. The company should have an investor relations program. Best Practice requires the CFO or CEO to assume this responsibility as part of the job. The company should make a policy statement concerning environmental and social responsibility issues.
Accounting and Auditing
The company should disclose which accounting principles it is using. It should comply with local practice and file consolidated annual statements where appropriate. Companies should file annual audited reports and semi-annual unaudited reports. Best Practice calls for filing quarterly unaudited reports. Audits should be conducted by an independent public accountant. Best Practice calls for adherence to the standards developed by the International Forum on Accountancy Development.
Off balance sheet transactions (e.g. operating leases and contingent liabilities) should be disclosed.
The audit committee should issue a statement on risk factors. For large companies, the audit committee should be chaired by an independent director. Best Practice calls for the audit committee chair to be an independent director regardless of company size. The chair must have a financial background. A minimum of one week should be allocated for any committee review of an audit. Communication between the internal and external auditor should be without having executives present. Any departures from accounting standards must be explained in the annual report.
Transparency of Ownership and Control
Best Practice calls for significant ownership (20-50%, including cross-holdings) to be deemed as control. For buyout offers to minority shareholders, Best Practice calls for ownership exceeding 35% to be considered as triggering a buyout offer in which all shareholders are treated equally.
Companies should disclose directors' and senior executives' shareholdings and all insider dealings by directors and senior executives should be disclosed within 3 days of execution. Best
Practice calls for shareholders with minimally significant ownership (3-10%) of outstanding shared to disclose their holdings. There should be independence between industry and government. There should be rules outlining acceptable employee and management conduct. This Institute of International Finance document is not the only comprehensive set of guidelines on corporate governance practices. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1999; 2002; 2003a&b) has several comprehensive documents as well.
Private groups have also issued comprehensive guidance documents. Gregory (2000) has published a major study that compares various sets of guidelines.
Merely having rules and guidelines is not enough to ensure success, however. Culture, institutions and organizational structure also play an important role. Roth and Kostova (2003) conducted a major study of 1,723 firms in 22 countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States and found that a firm's adopting a new governance structure will be helped or hindered based on these factors.
ASIAN CASE STUDIES
The World Bank (2003; 2004a & b; 2005a, b & c; 2006a & b) 
Participation Rights
Shareholders have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently informed on, decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes, such as: (1) amendments to the governing documents of the company; (2) the authorization of additional shares; and (3) extraordinary transactions that in effect result in the sale of the company. (World Bank 2004a) Table 2 shows how the countries score in the area of participation rights. This time Indonesia largely observes participation rights, whereas Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam only partly observe these rights. None of the countries earned the top rating for equal treatment of shareholders, as can be seen in Table 6 . Vietnam had the lowest, with a rating of materially not observed. Table 7 shows the scores for the prohibiting insider trading category. None of the countries achieved the highest score. Vietnam had the lowest score.
Although most of the guidelines on corporate governance encourage beneficial activity and discourage inappropriate activity, this guideline is different. There is evidence to show that insider trading can sometimes be beneficial, in the sense that it helps markets to work more efficiently. The argument has been made that insider trading should be allowed in cases where the result is a positive-sum game, providing there have been no breaches of fiduciary duty or violations of rights (McGee, 2008) . Rules that merely prohibit insider trading without taking particular circumstances into account are counterproductive. 
Disclosure of Interests
Members of the board and managers should be required to disclose any materials interests in transactions or matters affecting the corporation. (World Bank 2004a)
None of the countries had the top rating in the category of disclosure of interests.
Malaysia and Thailand had the next highest rating; Vietnam had the lowest rating. Table 8 shows the ratings. 
Stakeholder Rights Respected
The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of stakeholders as established by law and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises. The corporate governance framework should assure that the rights of stakeholders that are protected by law are respected. (World Bank 2004a) Table 9 shows the relative scores. Malaysia and Thailand scored in the second best category. Indonesia and Vietnam only partially observed this guideline. 
Redress for Violation of Rights
Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violations of their rights. (World Bank 2004a) Table 10 shows the results. Malaysia and Thailand largely observed this principle.
Indonesia and Vietnam only partially observed it. 
Performance Enhancement
The corporate governance framework should permit performance-enhancement mechanisms for stakeholder participation. (World Bank 2004a) Table 11 shows the scores for each country. Malaysia and Thailand scored in the largely observed category. Indonesia and Vietnam only partially observe this principle. . 
Access to Information
Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have access to relevant information. (World Bank 2004a) Table 12 shows the ratings. Malaysia and Thailand largely observe this principle.
Indonesia and Vietnam only partially observe it. 
Disclosure Standards
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and the governance of the company. Disclosure standards were not particularly good for any of the countries. None of them earned the top rating. Vietnam had the lowest rating in this category. Table 13 shows the results. 
Accounting & Audit Standards
Information should be prepared, audited and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards of accounting, financial and non-financial disclosure, and audit.
(World Bank 2004a) Table 14 shows the ratings for accounting and audit standards. Malaysia was the only country that had the top rating. There is a lot of room for improvement in this category. The other three countries only partly observed these standards. 
Independent Audits
An annual audit should be conducted by an independent auditor in order to provide an external and objective assurance on the way in which financial statements have been prepared and presented. (World Bank 2004a)
As Table 15 shows, none of the countries observed the guideline for independent audits, although half of them largely observed it. The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management of the board, and the board's accountability to the company and the shareholders. Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the shareholders. (World Bank 2004a)
As Table 17 shows, none of the countries achieved the top score for due diligence and care. All countries scored in the partially observed category. None of the countries always treat all shareholders fairly, as is shown in Table 18 .
Malaysia and Thailand largely observe this benchmark. The highest score achieved for the principle was in the partially observed category. Three of the four countries achieved this score. Vietnam had the worst score in the group, although it was not the lowest possible score. Table 19 shows the scores for each country. One might think that this item would show high scores, but such was not the case.
Malaysia and Thailand largely observe the access to information principle. Indonesia and Vietnam only partially observe it. Table 22 shows the results. Table   23 shows the scores, the averages and the percentages for each country.
Malaysia had the highest score at 85, which is 77.3 percent of what the top (perfect) score would be. In second place was Thailand, followed by Indonesia. Vietnam had the lowest overall score. Average scores are determined by dividing the total score by 22. For example, the average for Indonesia is 66/22 = 3.00. The percentage figures are computed by dividing the total score by 110, which is what the perfect score would be if the country had scored 5 in each of the 22 categories. For Indonesia, the percent score is 66/110 = 60.0%. Chart 1 shows the scores for each country. None of the countries had a perfect score of 110 (100%). Malaysia came closest with a score of 77.3%. Thailand was next, with a score of 72.7%, followed by Indonesia (60.0%) and Vietnam (50.9%).
The next step was to determine whether the differences in scores were significant. Table   24 shows the results of the tests of significance using the Wilcoxon test. The differences were significant in all cases except for that of Malaysia and Thailand. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
None of the countries earned a perfect score of 110, which means they all have some work to do to meet the corporate governance guidelines. But some countries have more work to do than others. Vietnam can be excused for having such a low score. It is a relatively new entrant to the market and has not been trying to attract foreign investment from the private sector as long as have some of the other Asian countries. The private sector in Vietnam is still in the fledgling stage and will probably continue at this level of development for some time, although the country has a relatively high growth rate. But it is starting from such a low level of economic activity that it has a way to go before becoming competitive in international capital markets.
The scores for each of these countries will likely improve with time. There is internal pressure to improve corporate governance as well as external pressure. The market provides incentives to improve and to compete in practically every area of economic activity, including the realm of corporate governance. Those who do not clean up their act will be left behind as corporations in other countries improve their corporate governance practices.
